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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Following the full opening of the postal market to competition, the third European Directive 
makes a distinction between single piece (SP) mail and bulk mail (BM) to include the SP in the 
universal service and exclude BM from the universal service.   SP mail comprises of social and 
business mail, and there is the option for BM market to include access to the incumbent 
operator’s network.   
 
This opens up to competition the upstream market in collection, outward sortation and 
transportation not only for BM, but also for all upstream mail if entrants can consolidate SP 
and BM upstream.  While the fixed upstream costs for the social mail network may be 
prohibitively high for entry with respect to collection from post boxes, it may be less so for 
business mail where collection of larger mailings is made from businesses directly or from 
dedicated collection hubs.  This form of market opening appears to leave the universal service 
provider (USP) exposed in its recovery of fixed upstream costs for business mail.   
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Furthermore, when direct ex ante regulation is withdrawn and replaced by ex post regulation as 
may be appropriate in a declining market, it can be accompanied by greater regulatory 
information requirements including accounting separation and transfer pricing.  Transfer prices 
are implicit or explicit internal charges levied by one part of a vertically integrated business to 
another part of its business.  This information can then be used by the business to inform 
pricing decisions, and by the regulatory authorities to inform assessments of whether behavior 
by a firm amounts to an abuse of dominance.   
 
If the USP offers an access price for BM business mail, there is neither an explicit access price 
for SP business mail nor explicit internal transfer prices for SP or BM business mail. In general 
the transfer prices might be expected to have similar characteristics to the access prices offered 
to third parties, where those access prices exist, and to reflect what market access prices might 
be if they were to be offered to third parties but are not in fact offered.  Indeed, within the 
postal sector if the incumbent operator is unable to distinguish between SP and BM from 
entrants for access pricing purposes, then the effective access price for these two markets may 
be the same.   
This paper explores the impact of upstream competition on the USP, under different 
assumptions, through a model framework that is an extension of that developed by De Donder 
et al (2008).  That paper explored cases where the incumbent Postal Operator (PO) or USP 
comprises a Mail Network Operator (MNO) with a single good for the SP market and an 
access good (for both urban and rural zones) in the BM market, and Retail Business (RB) 
selling a BM good (for both urban and rural zones) with a competitive fringe in BM.  The 
paper assumed welfare maximization subject to break even for the USP and looked at the effect 
on welfare and pricing of different breakeven constraints and pricing rules on the PO, MNO 
and RB, including the effect on urban and rural access prices in the BM market.   
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In this paper, the MNO and RB introduce a market distinction between SP social and SP 
business mail in addition to BM business mail, with access and transfer prices in both business 
mail markets.  Hence the MNO has one end-to-end service for SP social mail and two access 
services for SP business and BM, and the RB has two end-to-end business services. Imperfect 
competition in the upstream SP business and BM business mail markets is assumed. 
Geographic zones are excluded to focus on the impact of competition upstream on prices, 
welfare and finances of the USP.  The model is calibrated to gain numerical results and provide 
further insight, including the effects of different levels of intensity of competition, switching to 
entrants and access pricing rules. 
 
Section 2 sets out the details of the model and scenarios considered.  The inputs to the model 
are calibrated in Section 3 with numerical examples then applied in Section 4.   Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  THE MODEL 
 
There are three postal operators: a retail business (RB), a Mail Network Operator (MNO) and 
entrants. The MNO sells one final good to customers: SP social mail, while the RB sells two: 
SP business mail and BM business mail. For simplicity, we assume that the three types of 
goods have independent demands. The entrants sell SP and BM business mail, while there is no 
competition for SP social mail. The two goods sold by entrants are imperfect substitutes of the 
corresponding two goods offered by the RB, but the demands for entrants’ SP business mail 
and BM business mail are independent from each other.  
x  denotes  (generic) SP and y = BM, with a subscript S  for social (SP) and B  for business 
(SP), and with a superscript I  for the RB (incumbent) and E  for the entrants. 
There is one representative sender of SP social mail, whose utility is 
4 
 
 1( )S Su x qx I    
where Sx  denotes the quantity of SP social mail sold by the RB, q  its final price and 1I  the 
sender’s exogenous income. The demand function ( )sx q  is obtained by maximizing ( )su x with 
respect to .Sx  
 The quantity of SP business mail sold by the RB is denoted by IBx , and its price by IBq . 
Similarly,  EBx  denotes the quantity of SP business mail sold by the entrants, and EBq  its price. 
There is one representative sender of SP business mail, whose utility is 
 2( )I E I I E EB B B B B Bv x x q x q x I      
where 2I  is the sender’s exogenous income. The demand functions ( )I I EB B Bx q q  and ( )E I EB B Bx q q
are obtained by maximizing this utility with respect to quantities ( IBx and EBx ). 
Similarly,  for BM: Iy  (resp., Ey ) denotes the quantity of BM sold by the RB (resp., entrants), 
and Ip  (resp., Ep ) its price. There is one representative sender of BM, whose utility is 
 3( )I E I I E Ew y y p y p y I      
where 3I  is the sender’s exogenous income. The demand functions ( )
I I Ey p p  and 
( )E I Ey p p   are obtained by maximizing this utility with respect to quantities ( Iy and Ey ). 
There are two types of activities in the postal sector: upstream (collection, sorting and 
transportation) and downstream (delivery).  The MNO performs the downstream (delivery) 
activities for all five goods ( Sx  ,  I EB Bx x , and I Ey y ), and also the upstream activities for SP 
social mail ( Sx ). The RB takes care of the upstream activities for BM (
Iy ) and SP business (
I
Bx ). The RB then has to buy access to the MNO’s delivery network and to pay the MNO an 
access charge for both IBx  and 
Iy . For each unit of mail delivered requiring access to the MNO 
delivery network, the RB pays an access charge of IBa  for SP business mail and of 
I
ya  for BM.  
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The entrants sell SP business mail and BM business mail, but they only perform the upstream 
activities and buy access to the MNO delivery network, for which they pay a unit access charge 
of EBa  for SP business mail and 
E
ya  for BM. Bypass is not allowed.  
The cost structure of the industry is as follows.  
The MNO faces one large fixed cost for all its downstream activities, denoted by DF  (subscript 
D  stands for downstream). Downstream marginal costs are assumed to be the same for all five 
goods (SP social mail, SP business mail by RB and by E, and BM by I and E) and denoted by 
Dc   The MNO also faces an upstream fixed cost for SP social mail, denoted by USF . The 
upstream marginal cost for SP social mail is denoted by USc .  
The RB faces fixed costs in its upstream activities for both SP business mail (denoted by IBF ) 
and for BM (denoted by IyF ). The (constant) upstream marginal cost of the RB is denoted by 
I
Bc  for SP business mail and by 
I
yc  for BM.  
The (constant) upstream marginal costs of the entrants are the same across entrants and are 
denoted by EBc  for SP business mail and by 
E
yc  for BM. For simplicity the entrants are assumed 
to face no fixed costs.  
The RB’s profit function is given by 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
I I I I I I E I
B B B B B B B
I I I I I E I
y y y
q a c x q q F
p a c y p p F
     
       
where the RB controls the two final prices IBq  and 
Ip .  
The MNO’s profit function is given by 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
N
US D S US
I I I E E E I E
B D B B B B D B B B
I I I E E E I E
y D y D D
q c c x q F
a c x q q a c x q q
a c y p p a c y p p F
    
     
       
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where the MNO controls the final price q  and four downstream access charges ( IBa , EBa , 
I
ya  
and Eya ).  
The entrants’ profits are given by  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
E E E E E I E
B B B B B B
E E E E I E
y y
q a c x q q
p a c y p p
    
      
where the entrants control two final goods’ prices: EBq  and 
Ep .  
Finally, social welfare is given by 
 
1 2
3
1 2 3
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I E I I E E
S S B B B B B B
I E I I E E I E N
I E I E
S B B
US D S
I I I E E E I E
B D B B B B D B B B
I I I E E E I E
y D y D
W u x qx I v x x q x q x I
w y y p y p y I
u x v x x w y y
c c x q
c c x q q c c x q q
c c y p p c c y p p
I I I
       
       
    
 
     
     
   I IUS D B yF F F F    
 
 
The pricing behavior of the postal operators is studied assuming that the MNO and the RB 
maximize welfare subject to a profit constraint and concentrate on Ramsey prices to consider 
several sets of constraints, in addition to the profit constraint. The objective is to focus on 
numerical examples, in order to shed light on the impact of these different sets of constraints 
on prices, volumes, contribution to profits, consumer surplus and welfare. Numerical 
simulations also make it possible to check whether there exists a vector of prices that satisfies 
all the constraints. The various optimization problems solved for are described briefly before 
moving to the sections devoted to the calibration and numerical results.  
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Initially a hypothetical monopoly situation is examined. The Appendix derives demand 
functions ( )IM IB Bx q  and ( )
IM Iy p and profit functions IM  and NM . Initially also the profit 
constraint is assumed to be global, 
 0IM NM     
which would be the case for instance if both the RB and the MNO were part of the same postal 
operator.  
The Ramsey problem with one global profit constraint is then  
 
1 2 3
max ( ) ( 0) ( 0)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
I I
B
M I I
S B
q q p
I IM I IM I
US D S B D B y D
I I
US D B y
W u x v x w y
c c x q c c x q c c y p
I I I F F F F
 
    
     
       
 
 
 
subject to 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
IM NM
I I IM I I I IM I
US D S B B D B B y D
I I
US D B y
q c c x q q c c x q p c c y p
F F F F
  
        
    
 
The following Ramsey prices are obtained: 
 
1
1 ( )
1
1 ( )
1
1 ( )
US D
S
I I
B B D
I IM I
B B B
I I
y D
I IM I
y
q c c
q q
q c c
q q
p c c
p p

 

 

 
   
   
   
 
where   is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint 0IM NM    and where ( )S q , 
( )IM IB Bq  and ( )IM Iy p  represent, respectively, the direct price elasticity of the demand for SP 
business mail , SP business mail and BM in a monopoly situation.  
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It is easy to show analytically that the same retail prices would obtain if one were to look at the 
same problem with two separate profit constraints: 0IM  and 0NM  . The intuition is that 
the two access prices IBa  and 
I
ya  are used so that both the RB and the MNO break even. This 
result was already underlined in De Donder et al. (2008).  
Entrants are then introduced into the model. Imperfect competition is assumed between 
entrants and the RB and, further, to simplify matters, entrants are assumed to post an 
exogenous mark-up over marginal costs for the two goods they sell. The mark-up for SP 
business mail is denoted by EBm , and the mark-up for BM by 
E
ym . Then:   
 
(1 )
(1 )
E E E E
B B B B
E E E E
y y y
q m a c
p m a c
   
   
   
     
and the MNO and RB’s Ramsey prices are solved for given these entrant’s prices. The two 
mark-ups EBm  and 
E
ym  can be considered to reflect the intensity of the competition between 
entrants, so that the numerical section reports how Ramsey prices are affected when the 
entrants’ mark-ups are exogenously changed. In addition, this formulation encompasses the 
case of a competitive fringe, where the entrant’s mark-ups are both zero. Note that whether the 
profit constraint imposed is global or imposed separately on the MNO and the RB is 
immaterial, because the planner can use the access charges Iya  and IBa  to transfer income from 
one operator to the other so that both break even. 
Finally, the case is considered where access charges follow the equi-proportional mark-up 
(EPMU) rule and are set according to  
 (1 )E I E IB B y y Da a a a m c       
Observe that, since the downstream marginal costs are by assumption the same for the four 
goods, the EPMU rule results in the same access charge level being set for the four goods. 
Section 4  provides numerical illustrations of  final prices and reports how the EPMU setting of 
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the access charges impacts Ramsey prices when separate profit constraints for the RB and the 
MNO are imposed.  
3 CALIBRATION 
The calibration assumptions are based on De Donder et al. (2008) modified to take account of 
the fact that SP mail is split between social and business. The assumptions are not estimates 
from a particular postal operator, but they are intended to reflect the general nature of postal 
markets and cost structures given published empirical studies.  
The initial situation is a hypothetical one where the RB faces no competition. The USP sets a 
price of 0.50 for SP social mail and a price of 0.40 for SP business mail and for BM. Total 
quantities sold at those prices are 2bn, 3bn and 5bn items, respectively. The direct price 
elasticities are -0.2 for SP social mail, -0.25 for SP business mail and -0.5 for BM. Linear 
demands are calibrated based on these quantities, prices and elasticities.  
Further information is required to calibrate the (linear) demand functions for SP business mail 
and for BM in the presence of competition by entrants. With regard to the extent of entry, it is 
assumed for both SP business mail and for BM that the entrants’ total market share is 10% if 
their price is the same as the RB’s and 50% if they are 20% cheaper.1  On substitution, the 
displacement ratio of both SP business mail and BM offered by the entrants is assumed to be 
0.9.2   
The MNO’s marginal downstream cost Dc  is set at 0.12. The marginal upstream cost of SP 
social mail USc  is set at 0.18 so that the total marginal cost of social SP is 0.3. The marginal 
upstream cost of SP business mail is 0.15 for both the RB and the entrant ( E IB Bc c , so that its 
total marginal cost is 0.27 for both operators), while the marginal upstream cost of BM is 0.102 
for both the RB and the entrants ( E Iy yc c , for a total marginal cost of 0.222). The USP faces a 
total fixed cost of 1.680 billion which is assumed to include the normal remuneration of 
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capital.  There is no need for the analysis or calibrations to segment this, though in Section 4 
the contribution to total upstream fixed cost of the RB ( I IB yF F ) is examined on the 
assumption that this could be separately imposed in the budget constraint.  The reader can 
check that, with these demand and cost calibrations, the sum of the profits of the RB and of the 
MNO is zero (i.e., revenues exactly cover the sum of variable and fixed costs).  
 
4.  NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATIONS  
 
For ease of reference the results of the monopoly case are reported under the same assumptions 
as De Donder et al (2008) in the first column of Table 1.  The comparative welfare maximizing 
results subject to the USP (MNO+RB) breaking even are shown, where there are two access 
services and two entrants’ services and the MNO can distinguish SP business mail from BM.  
The results are for two scenarios where the entrants firstly have ( E EB ym m ) 20% mark ups on 
their marginal costs (in the second column of figures) and secondly have greater competition 
intensity and a competitive fringe with 0% mark up on their marginal costs (in the third column 
of figures).  The consequences of the MNO being unable to distinguish the access prices are 
then reported, with the same EPMU mark up on downstream marginal costs, for the two 
scenarios (in the fourth and fifth columns respectively).    
 
In each case all prices are above marginal costs, including the access prices charged to the 
entrant. The implicit transfer prices paid by the RB to the MNO play no role in the formulation 
of results shown in Table 1 because of the combined RB+MNO break even constraint, but 
observe that in each case both prices of the RB exceed their corresponding access price plus 
upstream marginal cost.  For the scenarios shown, when the MNO can set distinct access prices 
the RB’s prices exceed those of the entrants, but when the MNO cannot the relative prices of 
the RB and entrants depend on the level of mark-up applied and competitive intensity of the 
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entrants.  Observe also that the end-to-end price for SP business mail is higher than that for the 
end-to-end price for BM business mail, and this is the case even when the access prices are set 
to be the same.   
 
With distinct access prices and a low competitive intensity (in the second column) the MNO 
sets a higher access price for SP business than for BM to reflect the more inelastic demand for 
the SP business market and the same marginal downstream cost.  The overall level of the 
access prices are set sufficiently low to avoid the SP business and BM prices rising sharply 
from those under the monopoly case. The contributions toward the recovery of fixed costs of 
business (SP and bulk) mail for the MNO and the RB are reported based on the assumption that 
internal prices are equal to access charges paid by the entrant. Compared to the monopoly 
situation,3 the MNO loses some contribution from the introduction of upstream competition 
and the USP raises all its end-to-end prices as it becomes more difficult for it to break even.   
 
In contrast, when the competitive intensity increases upstream (in the third column of figures) 
so that entrants' profit is zero, the USP has the opportunity to raise its access prices more 
without introducing higher end-to-end prices.  In fact, the RB lowers its end-to-end prices 
(compared to the second column), which further reduces the differences between its prices and 
the access prices. In fact, the end-to-end prices are remarkably similar to the monopoly case. 
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Table 1: Illustrative results for the USP (MNO and RB) 
 
    With distinct access prices  With same access prices 
    Monopoly  Low 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
20% 
High 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
0% 
Low 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
20% 
High 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
0% 
Prices (Є):             
Single piece social – MNO  xp   0.592  0.606  0.591  0.618  0.604 
Single piece business – RB   I
Bq   0.457  0.463  0.456  0.420  0.410 
Single piece business ‐ Entrant   E
Bq   ‐  0.456  0.441  0.410  0.393 
Bulk mail business – RB  Ip   0.328  0.331  0.327  0.350  0.349 
Bulk mail business ‐ Entrant  
 
Access single piece business ‐ MNO 
 
Access bulk mail business ‐ MNO 
 
Ep  
E
Ba  
 
E
ya  
‐ 
 
‐ 
 
‐ 
0.330 
 
0.230 
 
0.173 
0.321 
 
0.291 
 
0.219 
 
0.352 
 
0.192 
 
0.192 
0.345 
 
0.243 
 
0.243 
Quantities (bn):             
Single piece social  ‐ MNO  Sx   1.926  1.915  1.927  1.905  1.916 
Single piece business – RB   I
Bx   2.893  2.593  2.484  2.572  2.470 
Single piece business ‐ Entrant , MNO  E
Bx   ‐  0.322  0.455  0.434  0.567 
Bulk mail business – RB  
Iy   5.452  4.789  4.668  4.781  4.642 
Bulk mail business – Entrant, MNO  
Ey   ‐  0.715  0.873  0.587  0.753 
Total    10.271  10.333  10.408  10.279  10.348 
Contribution to fixed cost – USP 
(Єbn): 
           
Single piece social ‐ MNO     0.562  0.586  0.561  0.606  0.582 
Single piece business – MNO    0.541  0.319  0.503  0.215  0.374 
Bulk mail business – MNO    0.576  0.291  0.548  0.385  0.664 
Subtotal – MNO    1.680  1.196  1.612  1.206  1.620 
Single piece business – RB      0.216  0.038  0.202  0.042 
Bulk mail business – RB      0.268  0.031  0.272  0.019 
Subtotal (upstream) – RB      0.484  0.068  0.474  0.061 
 
Profit subtotal – MNO+RB 
   
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
Profit subtotal – Entrant    ‐  0.064  0.000  0.064  0.000 
Consumer surplus (Єbn)             
Single piece social    2.320  2.293  2.321  2.269  2.295 
Single piece business    2.218  2.218  2.240  2.346  2.380 
Bulk mail business    2.371  2.371  2.394  2.262  2.275 
Total    6.929  6.882  6.956  6.877  6.950 
             
Welfare (Єbn)    6.929  6.945  6.956  6.941  6.950 
Lagrange multiplier    0.138  0.146  0.137  0.154  0.146 
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The higher access prices enhance the contribution to the fixed network costs from the business 
mail, and the contribution from RB upstream reduces from €0.484bn to €0.068bn, but this is 
more than offset by the increase in contribution from the MNO prices which increases from 
€1.196bn to €1.612bn (as the entrants profit reduces to zero),  The lower mark up by the 
entrants both grows the market (marginally) and their market share (from 12% to 16%), which 
has the effect of making it easier for the USP to break even (as reflected by the lower Lagrange 
multiplier) and marginally increasing consumer surplus in all three markets as well as welfare.   
 
With the access prices set the same by applying an EPMU rule to the same marginal costs for 
the two business segments (in the fourth and fifth columns of figures), the access prices 
increase for BM business mail and reduce for SP business mail.  There are corresponding 
prices movements for RB’s prices and an increase in the contribution from the BM business 
market.  However, this reduces overall market volumes and welfare, and it becomes more 
difficult for the USP to break even.  It would then be in the interests of the USP to have distinct 
access prices between the two markets of business mail if they could be applied. 
 
Overall, the effects of changing assumptions are all rather small. for the calibrations used in the 
numerical illustrations.  The difference in welfare between having distinct access prices and the 
same access prices for the two business segments is just €4-6m and the difference in welfare 
between having low and high competitive intensity is just €8-9m.  Indeed, the potential welfare 
enhancement of high competitive intensity within these illustrations is based on a market 
growth of less than 1% from greater entrants’ market share, which may be overshadowed, in 
practice, by other movements in the market from digital competition. Hence, perhaps the most 
significant result here is that the BM access price would be higher and therefore the 
contribution from BM greater, if the MNO cannot distinguish SP business and BM items for 
pricing. 
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The relatively small effects of changing assumptions may be due in part to the low propensity 
to switch to entrants services assumed and so  the case is considered where the USP can set 
distinct access prices for SP business mail and BM but faces a greater propensity to switch to 
the entrants.  More specifically, for both the SP business and BM markets, it is assumed that 
the entrants would obtain 50% of the market for equal prices and 90% if they were 25% 
cheaper than the USP.  
 
Table 2 considers the case where the entrants’ services are more attractive and the entrants 
have a greater market share of the business mail.  This is done for the two scenarios of Ramsey 
pricing with 20% and 0% mark ups on their marginal costs by the entrants (in the first and third 
columns of figures respectively), with the difference relative to the corresponding case from 
Table 1 (from the second and fourth columns of figures respectively) also shown.  As this 
change has the effect of reducing the RB’s upstream contribution to just €7m for the high 
competitive intensity case, the directional change to the results is also shown when a higher 
contribution is imposed on the RB in Table 2 (final column). 
 
The RB’s share of business mail reduces to 46%-51% under the two scenarios presented and 
the higher entrants’ shares leads to an increase in the access prices.  When the entrants apply a 
high (20%) mark-up in Table 2 (in the first column of figures), the entrants and USP both raise 
their end-to-end prices, but the USP increases them to a lesser degree, and sets a BM price 
below the entrant price (as compared to equivalent case in Table 1 where the RB sets its prices 
above those of the entrant).  The RB’s prices remain above the sum of the access price and 
marginal upstream cost.  The lower market share for the USP reduces its contribution from 
business mail as well as its contribution from RB while the MNO’s contribution increases 
(including from the SP social market).  Total volume, consumer surplus and welfare all  
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Table 2:  Illustrative results for the USP (MNO and RB) with lower market share 
conditions 
 
    Distinct access prices 
    Low 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
20% 
Change 
relative to 
lower 
entrant 
share 
from 2nd 
column of 
Table 1 
High 
competitive 
intensity 
with 
Entrant 
mark up of 
0% 
Change 
relative to 
lower 
entrant 
share 
from 3rd 
column of  
Table 1 
Direction of 
change when 
RB required 
to increase  
contribution 
relative to 3rd 
column of 
this table 
Prices (Є):             
Single piece social – MNO  xp   0.643  +0.037  0.582  ‐0.009  + 
Single piece business – RB   I
Bq   0.476  +0.013  0.451  ‐0.005  + 
Single piece business ‐ Entrant   E
Bq   0.477  +0.021  0.444  +0.003  ‐ 
Bulk mail business – RB  Ip   0.338  +0.007  0.324  ‐0.003  + 
Bulk mail business ‐ Entrant  
 
Access single piece business ‐ MNO 
 
Access bulk mail business ‐ MNO 
 
Ep  
E
Ba  
E
ya  
0.346 
 
0.247 
 
0.186 
+0.016 
 
+0.017 
 
+0.013 
 
0.325 
 
0.294 
 
0.223 
 
+0.004 
 
+0.003 
 
+0.004 
‐ 
 
‐ 
 
‐ 
Quantities (bn):             
Single piece social  ‐ MNO  Sx   1.885  ‐0.030  1.934  +0.007  ‐ 
Single piece business – RB   I
Bx   1.571  ‐1.022  1.450  ‐1.034  ‐ 
Single piece business ‐ Entrant , MNO  E
Bx   1.430  +1.108  1.616  +1.161  + 
Bulk mail business – RB  
Iy   3.054  ‐1.735  2.938  ‐1.730  ‐ 
Bulk mail business – Entrant, MNO  
Ey   2.589  +1.874  2.818  +1.945  + 
Total    10.530  +0.197  10.756  +0.348  + 
Contribution to fixed cost – USP 
(Єbn): 
           
Single piece social ‐ MNO     0.647  +0.061  0.546  ‐0.015  + 
Single piece business – MNO    0.382  +0.063  0.532  +0.029  ‐ 
Bulk mail business – MNO    0.375  +0.084  0.595  +0.047  ‐ 
Subtotal – MNO    1.404  +0.208  1.673  +0.061  ‐ 
Single piece business – RB    0.123  ‐0.093  0.010  ‐0.028  + 
Bulk mail business – RB    0.153  ‐0.115  ‐0.003  ‐0.034  + 
Subtotal (upstream) – RB    0.276  ‐0.208  0.007  ‐0.061  + 
 
Profit subtotal – MNO+RB 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0 
Profit subtotal – Entrant    0.263  +0.199  0.000  0.000  0 
Consumer surplus (Єbn)             
Single piece social    2.221  ‐0.072  2.338  +0.017  ‐ 
Single piece business    2.238  +0.020  2.325  +0.085  ‐ 
Bulk mail business    2.435  +0.064  2.534  +0.140  + 
Total    6.894  +0.012  7.198  +0.243  ‐ 
             
Welfare (Єbn)    7.157  +0.212  7.198  +0.243  ‐ 
Lagrange multiplier    0.171  +0.025  0.132  ‐0.005  + 
 
increase.  The SP social price increase lowers its consumer surplus but this is more than offset 
by the increase in consumer surplus for business mail.   
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When there is a high competitive intensity and a competitive fringe (with entrants mark ups of 
zero), the levels of RB contribution were already low when the entrants’ market share was low 
in Table 1 (in the second column of figures), and is even lower with a greater propensity to 
switch to the entrants in Table 2 (in the third column of figures).  Something different happens 
when the USP has a lower market share and sets higher access prices.  The entrants increase 
their prices, but the USP lowers all of its end-to-end prices to the point where the RB price is 
above the entrants’ prices in SP business and below the entrants’ prices in BM business, such 
that RB’s contribution from BM is negative.   This illustrates where the RB prices below 
access price plus marginal cost and enhances welfare, with the entrants retaining a high market 
share.  The RB makes a negative contribution to fixed network costs in the BM market and a 
low overall contribution from business mail of just €7m.  The welfare gain from raising the 
access price is greater than that from raising the SP social price, because of the greater 
entrants’ market share and the consumer surplus increases in each of the three customer 
segments to raise welfare.   
 
With the RB’s upstream contribution only just positive for the higher propensity to switch and 
high competitive intensity case, the effect of imposing the constraint of a higher contribution 
on the RB is explored.  This might be internally or externally imposed as a requirement for RB 
to make a greater contribution to its fixed network upstream costs.   
 
The directional changes arising from the introduction of this additional constraint are shown in 
Table 2 (in the final column).  While welfare maximizing subject to the revised budget 
constraint and overall break even, the USP increases its end-to-end prices (RB prices and 
MNO’s SP social price) and reduces its access prices.  The contribution from SP social and 
business increases and welfare reduces.  It becomes more difficult for the USP to break even as 
reflected in the increase in the Lagrange multiplier of the USP's profit constraint.  For the 
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calibrations assumed, the RB is limited in the contribution it can make.  Consequently 
imposing additional constraints upon the RB is neither beneficial to the USP, nor to overall 
welfare and is unnecessary for competition to have a high market share. 
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has explored the development of upstream competition and its impact on prices, the 
financing of the USP and welfare where the USP maximizes welfare.  The numerical 
illustrations indicate the relative scale and direction of movement arising from changes in 
market assumptions, which for the USP as a whole are often relatively small but for the RB 
and MNO are more material.   
 
Transfer prices were confirmed to play no direct role in the analysis and do not affect the 
behavior of the USP, as was shown in De Donder (2008).   They are therefore not necessarily 
informative for pricing decisions by the USP or its regulatory authorities.   
 
The paper has shown that the access prices charged by the MNO to entrants rise as competition 
intensifies (and the markup on entrants’ marginal costs falls).  As the contribution to fixed 
network costs made by the RB reduces, the USP also relies more heavily on recovering its 
fixed costs from both SP and BM business markets.  Greater market share loss upstream by the 
RB further reduces its contribution to the recovery of fixed costs and further increases the 
access prices and the MNO’s contribution.   
 
When the USP charges the same access price for both SP and BM business markets or the BM 
market alone, the RB’s end-to-end price was shown to not always be above that of the entrants, 
but can be below (depending on the level of competitive intensity).  Furthermore, when there is 
a greater propensity to switch to the entrants, it can lead to the RB reducing its business prices 
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and a situation where its prices are below the access price plus upstream marginal cost and 
entrants’ prices, with the entrants still holding a high share of the market.  Hence the RB prices 
that maximize welfare may be above or below the entrants’ prices access prices plus marginal 
upstream costs, with competition still having a high market share. 
 
The paper has also demonstrated that if higher contributions to the fixed upstream costs are 
imposed on the RB (either internally or externally), the USP finds it more difficult to break 
even and further there is a limit to the contribution that the RB can make.  The imposition of 
additional constraints upon the RB is neither beneficial to the USP nor to overall welfare and is 
also unnecessary for competition to have a high market share. 
 
If the MNO can apply distinct access prices to business mail with different market elasticities 
(in this case SP and BM business mail), this can improve the USP’s financial position (by 
making it relatively easier to break even).  This reduces the burden on the business market with 
the higher price elasticity (in BM).  Furthermore, the RB distinguishes between the two 
business markets even when the downstream access charges are the same.  Hence, more 
distinct pricing by USP can improve its financial position and increase welfare in the presence 
of upstream competition. 
 
The analysis did not include bypass competition, competition from digital media, and the 
potential relationships between upstream and bypass competition, so as to focus on the impact 
of upstream competition alone.  The development of upstream competition not only reduces 
the contribution to fixed network costs and raises access prices as has been shown, but also 
increases drop density of the mail volume held upstream by entrants, which would both 
increase the likelihood of bypass competition.  Hence the development of competition in the 
postal sector as a whole may be informed by the development of upstream competition and 
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remain a subject for further research under full market opening and alongside competition from 
digital media.   
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Appendix 
The demand functions for SP business mail and BM in case the RB has a monopoly over these 
two goods can be obtained easily: 
 
2
3
( ) is obtained from max ( 0)
( ) is obtained from max ( 0)
I
B
I
IM I I I I
B B B B B
x
IM I I I I
y
x q v x q x I
y p w y p y I
   
     
The profit functions of the operators are also easy to adapt to the monopoly situation: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
IM I I I IM I I
B B B B B B
I I I IM I I
y y y
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1The sensitivity of the results to this assumption is checked by also looking at results obtained when the entrants’ 
market share of both SP business mail and BM is 50% for equal prices and 90% if the entrants are 20% cheaper 
than the RB. 
2With linear demands, this means that for any 10 items sold by the entrants, 9 are displaced from the RB and 1 is 
net volume creation.  A higher displacement ratio would have the effect of reducing the market growth arising 
from the transfer of mail to the entrants, and therefore reduce the welfare benefit of entry.  The figure of 0.9 is 
used from illustrative purposes. The growth in that market from the switching of mail to entrants is not easily 
discerned and may be even lower in a declining market.   
3 For the monopoly case, in the absence of access charges and thus of a benchmark for internal prices, it is 
assumed that all contributions accrue to the MNO. 
